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Incentive and Redistribution Effects
of the German Tax Reform 2000
Gerhard Wagenhals*
This paper analyzes the impact on work incentives and income distribution
of the German tax reform 2000 and alternative tax regimes which might 
be viewed as examples for tax reforms on the agenda in Europe. The 
approach is based on a comprehensive microsimulation model for taxes, 
social security contributions and transfers in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, which is combined with a micro- econometric behavioral model.
The main findings of the paper are: the tax reform 2000 generates positive
labor supply incentives; almost all persons in dependent employment profit
from the tax reform. However, a significant decline in unemployment 
cannot be expected as a result of the tax reform alone. (JEL: H 31, J 22)
1.Introduction
The tax reform 2000 is one of the most important economic reforms in Ger-
many in the last few decades. Other countries such as France and Italy are
planning tax reforms along similar lines (see e.g. Financial Times Deutsch-
land,July 17th, 2000,p.1).This paper analyzes the impact on incentives and
income distribution of the German tax reform 2000.The analysis is based on
a comprehensive microsimulation model1, which uses a representative data
set, and which is combined with a microeconometric behavioral model for
the labor supply of married women in the Federal Republic of Germany.
During the last few decades,in the Federal Republic of Germany the pa-
rameters of tax,social security and transfer rules have changed considerably
and often not systematically. Examples include substantial increases of the
basic personal allowances by order of the German Federal Constitutional
Court on September 25th, 1992, a tenfold increase of the allowance for in-
* I am indebted to Harald Strotmann,Wolfgang Wiegard, Steffen Wirth and an unknown
referee for helpful comments and to Andrew Lawrence for checking my English.The data
of the German Socio-Economic Panel were provided by the German Institute of Eco-
nomic Research (DIW), Berlin.The usual disclaimer applies.
1 This microsimulation model GMOD has been used in several previous studies.See Wagen-
hals (1998, 1999) and the references quoted there.come from capital investment in 1993,which was then halved in 2000,the in-
troduction of an additional solidarity charge because of the German unifica-
tion, frequent changes of the basic and top rates, as well as many modifica-
tions of social security contributions and transfer rules.Therefore, marginal
effective tax rates,defined as sum of the marginal tax rates calculated accord-
ing to § 32a of the income tax law (EStG), the marginal social security con-
tributions and the marginal withdrawal rates of transfers,changed consider-
ably according to population and time.Individual labor supply responses may
be traced back to such exogenous changes of individual marginal effective
tax rates, with the German tax reforms during the second half of the 1980s
and during the 1990s serving as natural experiments.
Together with changes in wage dispersion and cohort effects,variations of
the marginal effective tax rates imply variations of marginal effective wage
rates and of net incomes from all sources of income.These changes offer an
opportunity to estimate labor supply effects.This paper adapts to the Ger-
man case an approach developed by Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998).
They used a sequence of tax reforms to identify and estimate the labor sup-
ply of married women in the United Kingdom.This approach is compatible
with the assumption of life cycle optimization.It allows for search unemploy-
ment and for fixed costs of work (such as child care or transportation costs).
The importance of fixed costs of work, as well as the significant number of
individuals actively looking for a new job, exclude the use of a Tobit model
or of one of the usual reservation wage models (see e.g.Mroz (1987)).
The main idea of the estimation procedure used is to group the data ac-
cording to age cohorts and education levels.The different growth rates of the
real wages in these groups reflect exogenous changes in the demand for 
labor of different levels of qualification,and these have to be excluded from
the labor supply equation.Female labor force participation,wages,other in-
come and labor supply are treated as endogenous variables.
In principle, macroeconomic repercussions of the tax reform, especially
the impact of the financing,e.g.by restricting tax depreciation arrangements,
by reducing public expenditures,by increasing taxes elsewhere or by new net
borrowing, could be integrated in the model. However, the corresponding
policy measures must be precisely formulated so that they can be converted
into computer code.At the time being,this is not the case.Here,the integra-
tion of the model in a numerically implemented intertemporal computable
equilibrium model2 might make sense, because the approach used in this
study is compatible with the assumption of life cycle utility maximization con-
trary to most other labor supply models3.
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2 See e.g.Fehr and Wiegard (1998).
3 See Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for a review of labor supply models.318 Gerhard Wagenhals
In this paper I do not attempt such a comprehensive macroeconomic anal-
ysis of the tax reform proposals. I “only” try to assess the impact of the tax
reform on labor supply incentives and income distribution,where I focus on
a precise mapping and analysis of the reforms.
The paper is organized as follows.The next section describes the data on
which the paper is based.Section 3 introduces the microeconometric behav-
ioral model. I present the estimated labor supply function as well as labor
supply elasticities which are the most important determinant when studying
the inefficiency of a tax system. Based on these results I analyze the impact
of recent tax reform proposals on incentives and income distribution.I com-
pare the impact of the proposals of the German government4, of the CDU/
CSU opposition5 and of a compromise finally adopted based on a recom-
mendation of the upper house of the German Parliament (Bundesrat)6.A  
final section summarizes the main results.
2. Data and Sample Selection
The analysis is based on the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP),waves
A to O,1984–1998.Some of the variables are sampled retrospectively,there-
fore the estimates are based on the period 1984–1997.After elimination of
evidently wrong or contradictory observations,I obtain a cleaned data set of
42,331 married couples and of 23,054 single persons.These data are the in-
put of my microsimulation model GMOD.For all private households and/or
persons in the sample this model generates a large number of variables, e.g.
income distinguished from all seven types of income in the German income
tax law,taxable income,income taxes,social security contributions (for health,
old age, unemployment and care insurances) as well as transfers (social as-
sistance, housing benefits and child allowance).Total and marginal tax and
social security burdens as well as total and marginal relief due to transfers
may be calculated for any individual or household and may be extrapolated
to the residential population of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Research on the labor supply of married men and single women almost
always shows very small responses to changes of taxes,social security contri-
4 Tax Reduction Act (Draft Bill), Parliamentary Papers (Drucksachen) No. 14/2683 and
14/3074 of the lower house of the German Parliament (Deutscher Bundestag).
5 Law for a Tax Reform to Foster Growth and Employment (Draft Bill),Parliamentary Paper
(Drucksache) 14/2903,Deutscher Bundestag.
6 Tax Reform Resolution of the federal states Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, Hamburg,
Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatine, Saxony-Anhalt and Schles-































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































butions and transfers.Therefore, I assume the labor supply of these groups
as given and concentrate on the labor supply of married women7.To estimate
the parameters of the behavioral model I select from the complete data set
of 42,331 married couples a subsample of married women aged between 23
and 55,who do not receive profit income (i.e.income from farming or forest-
ry, income from trade or business or income from independent activities),
and who are not eligible for social assistance or housing benefits, if the fe-
male does not work. Finally, civil servants are excluded.The age restriction
tries to avoid a mixing of labor supply, education and retirement decisions.
I exclude married women with profit incomes because I want to concentrate
on persons in dependent employment.To simplify,I concentrate on females
who are not eligible for social assistance or housing benefits when they are
out of work. Housing benefits and social assistance are means-tested bene-
fits which are taxed away at a rate up to 100 per cent.The budget sets of such
households are highly non convex, which complicates the estimation of la-
bor supply functions considerably8.
After the application of these three selection criteria I obtain a sample of
23,873 married women,13,840 of whom are in the labor force.The labor force
participation rate amounts to some 58 per cent.This is somewhat high com-
pared to the overall participation rate of married women in Germany and
results mainly from the non-eligibility criterion used in selecting the sample.
Tables 1 and 2 show descriptive statistics for the most important variables of
the model.
3. Microeconometric Model
3.1. Participation, Wages and Other Income
The microeconometric behavioral model presented in this section closely fol-
lows Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998) and Wagenhals (2000).The data
is treated as a sequence of cross sections.Three linear reduced form equa-
tions explain the labor force participation of married women,their wages and
the other income of the households. Explanatory variables are the effective
marginal tax rate when the female does not work, a complete set of group
variables,time variables,group-time-interaction variables and demographic
variables.I assume a linear relationship between the age of the youngest child
and labor supply.
7 Donni (1999) presents alternatives in the context of a collective model,where the spouse’s
labor supply is assumed to be constrained,but a sharing rule is taken into account.
8 See e.g. Laisney et al. (1999) or Friedberg (2000).The participation equation is modeled using a probit approach.The haz-
ard rate generated serves as an additional regressor in the wage equation to
allow for a potential selection bias.The estimation results show,however,that
the coefficient of Heckman’s selection term is not significantly different from
zero.(The P-value amounts to 0.149.)
Time-group interaction variables and the marginal effective tax rate when
the woman does not work,i.e.the excluded variables in the hours equation,
are significantly different from zero in all reduced forms.The P-value of the
corresponding Wald-test is less than 0.001.
3.2. Labor Supply
The parameters of the labor supply function are estimated consistently us-
ing the least squares method. If hit denotes the average number of hours
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics: Means (Standard Errors in Italics), New Federal States
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Sample of Workers
Weekly Hours 39.7 41.5 41.4 41.5 42.0 40.7 41.8 
9.7 8.3 8.6 9.1 10.0 9.5 10.1
Wage (DM) 14.5 15.5 16.2 16.9 17.3 18.7 18.2 
13.4 9.9 7.8 7.0 8.6 8.9 8.2
Other Income 32.2 41.2 46.0 46.6 49.0 50.2 47.9 
(1,000 DM) 12.9 24.1 21.1 20.1 21.6 49.4 25.9
Age 40.5 41.2 40.7 41.6 42.0 42.3 42.5 
8.6 8.2 8.2 8.1 8.1 8.0 7.8
Years of Education 12.9 13.0 13.1 13.1 13.1 13.1 13.1 
2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4
Children<16 0.97 0.88 0.94 0.82 0.80 0.75 0.67
Sample of Non Workers
Other Income 37.3 42.1 43.7 48.8 49.9 50.9 50.4 
(1,000 DM) 12.7 13.9 13.5 15.6 16.6 21.5 17.5
Age 40.5 41.4 41.9 42.0 42.1 43.1 42.9 
10.4 9.5 9.4 9.6 9.9 9.6 9.2
Years of Education 11.8 12.0 11.8 11.7 11.9 11.7 12.1 
2.2 2.3 1.7 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.1
Children<16 0.94 0.96 0.93 1.02 1.12 0.95 0.86
Participation Rate (per cent) 86.6 80.1 77.6 79.3 82.7 80.2 81.8
Note:Wages and Other Income in 1995 prices.Deflator:Cost-of-Living Index.322 Gerhard Wagenhals
worked per week by the i-th female in the financial year t,then the labor sup-





where the ag are coefficients of group-dummies, the mt are coefficients of
dummies for financial years,dit is a vector of demographic variables,witis the
individual marginal net wage, and mit is other income, defined as difference
between the household’s net disposable income and the female labor income.
v ˆit
p is the hazard rate from the reduced form participation equation, v ˆit
w and
v ˆit
m are the residuals from the reduced forms for wages and other income.
Table 3 shows the results for the weekly hours of work equation9.T h e
asymptotic standard errors,t- and P-values account for potential heteroske-
dasticity of unknown form,within group dependencies and the use of gener-
ated regressors, because the covariance matrix of the estimated parameters
is estimated by
where Q denotes the matrix of observations (including the time effects, the
group effects and the generated regressors) over the whole sample.Qgt is the
corresponding matrix for a group gin year t.v ˆgtdenotes the vector of estimat-
ed residuals within a group g in year t. d ˆ
k is the estimated coefficient of the
kth vector of reduced form residuals (k=1,2,3),Ggt
k is the matrix of explan-
atory variables of the kth reduced form equation,and V(g ˆk) is the covariance
matrix of the vector of coefficients g ˆkof the kth reduced form equation.Under
weak assumptions Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998,Appendix B) show
that V ˆ is consistent,if the number of groups G and the number of time peri-
ods T is fixed,but the number of individuals in each group goes to infinity.
The exogeneity of the participation decision,the wage rate and the other
income may be directly tested using the t-statistics of the dparameters (Smith
and Blundell,1986).
Table 4 shows the financial year dummies.By and large,time effects have
been declining over time and have been insignificant since the early 1990s.
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9 Individual effects are not presented because I treat the data as a sequence of cross sec-
tions.Utilizing the information on the panel structure of the data,I also estimated a fixed-
effects model using the within estimator.The results were in line with the results presented
in table 3. Of course, the time invariant regressors of the labor supply equation were
spanned by the individual effects.I also estimated a random-effects model using a feasible
generalized least squares estimator, but a Hausman test rejected the appropriateness of
this approach.323 Incentive and Redistribution Effects of the German Tax Reform 2000 
R2 = 0.313;R ¯2 = 0.312;Root MSE = 10.5
Source: Own calculations. Note:The East-West-Dummy equals 0 for the “old” federal states,
1 otherwise.“Low Education Level”is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the number of years




Variable Coef. Std.error t-value P-value
Constant 32.8 3.97 8.27 0.00
Youngest Child Aged
0–2 –7.68 2.55 –3.01 0.03
3–6 –7.78 1.55 –5.01 0.00
7–10 –5.50 1.18 –4.67 0.00
11–15 –3.77 0.95 –3.96 0.00
Log Wage 2.92 1.27 2.30 0.02
Other Income –0.12 0.07 –1.64 0.10
East-West-Dummy 10.6 1.75 6.07 0.00
Birth Cohort
Before 1940 –6.99 1.72 –4.06 0.00
1940–1949 –4.72 1.22 –3.87 0.00
1950–1959 –2.20 0.75 –2.92 0.00
Low Education Level –1.23 0.83 –1.48 0.14
Residuals
Participation 1.34 2.69 0.50 0.62
Wages –7.69 1.18 –6.53 0.00
Other Income –0.07 0.07 –0.93 0.35
Table 4
Time Effects on Labor Supply, 1984–1995
Financial Year 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Coefficient 4.45 3.24 3.44 3.43 2.13 2.85
Standard Error 1.01 0.88 0.77 0.76 0.68 0.77
Financial Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Coefficient 1.77 0.95 1.53 0.83 0.64 0.27
Standard Error 0.81 0.69 0.70 0.73 0.62 0.44
Source:Own calculations.Base Financial Years 1996 and 1997.324 Gerhard Wagenhals
Blundell,Duncan and Meghir (1998) showed the same development of time
effects for female labor supply in the United Kingdom.
3.3. Elasticities
Labor supply elasticities determine the inefficiency costs of tax reforms.
Therefore, I estimate these elasticities for all households in the sample.
Table 5 shows that all elasticities are moderately sized. Almost all income
elasticities are negative, all compensated and uncompensated wage elastic-
ities are positive.Thus, the restrictions implied by economic theory are ful-
filled for every household in the sample.
4. Policy Simulations
4.1. Introduction
The labor supply elasticities allow an analysis of the impact on incentives and
income distribution of the tax reform 2000. Previous studies of this reform
were restricted to summarizing conjectured tax revenues and an assessment
of the impact on “typical” (whatever this may mean) and fictitious house-
holds without allowing for behavioral responses of households.The results
presented here are based on a comprehensive microsimulation model which
is combined with the microeconometric behavioral model sketched above.
This combined model allows to assess the impact on tax revenues, on labor
Table 5
Labor Supply Elasticities, Married Women, Federal Republic of Germany,
1984–1997 
Statistic Income Uncompensated Compensated
Elasticity Wage Elasticity Wage Elasticity
Mean –0.19 0.12 0.25 
Standard Deviation 0.38 0.14 0.23 
Minimum –14.4 0.03 0.04 
First Quartile –0.20 0.07 0.18 
Median –0.09 0.08 0.22
Third Quartile –0.05 0.13 0.27
Maximum 1.51 2.96 8.66
Source:Own calculations based on individual elasticities.325 Incentive and Redistribution Effects of the German Tax Reform 2000 
supply incentives and on the income distribution of reforms of the German
tax,social security and benefit system.I avoid any interpretation-bias which
may be caused by an arbitrary selection of examples.
4.2. Reform Proposals
The tax reform 2000 is the most ambitious tax program in the history of the
Federal Republic.The government’s draft of the tax reduction law 2000 sched-
uled three steps,in the financial years 2001/02,2003/04 and 2005 (final stage).
The CDU/CSU opposition proposed a faster reform in two steps, in the fi-
nancial years 2001/02 and 2003 (final stage).On July 14th,2000,the govern-
ment agreed on a compromise with the upper house (Bundesrat),which rep-
resents the German federal states (Länder).Figure 1 shows marginal tax rates
of the status quo (i.e.financial year 2000) as well as of the final reform stag-
es.Table 6 summarizes the central elements of the tax reform 2000: succes-
sive increases of the basic personal allowance and successive rate cuts,includ-
ing reductions of the basic tax rates and of the top tax rates. Measures to fi-
nance the reform are mainly concentrated on restrictions of existing tax de-
preciation arrangements.
Figure 1
Marginal Tax Rate Functions
Source:Own calculations according to the sources mentioned in footnotes 4,5 and 6.326 Gerhard Wagenhals
Table 6
Tax Reform 2000. Proposals of Government, Opposition and Compromise
in Comparison
Status Government Opposition Compro- 
Quo mise
Financial Year 2000 2001 2003 2005 2001 2003 2005
Basic Tax Rate  22.9 19.9 17.0 15.0 18.0 15.0 15.0
[%]
Top Tax Rate 51.0 48.5 47.0 45.0 42.0 35.0 42.0
[%]
Basic Personal  13,500 14,000 14,500 15,000 14,000 14,500 15,000
Allowance [DM]
Lower Bound  115,000 107,500 102,000 98,500 108,000 110,000 102,000
for Application
of Top Tax Rate
[DM]
Sources:See footnotes 4,5 and 6.DM figures rounded to full 500 DM.
10 See Xu (2000) on inference using the iterated-bootstrap method.
4.3. Incentives
To analyze the impact of the tax reform on labor supply incentives and in-
come distribution,all taxes,social security contributions and transfers of the
financial years 1984–1997 are assessed again with all applicable changes of
the tax, social security and transfer laws. The simulations are based on the
data for the financial year 1997, updated to the financial year 2000.Then I
simulate the economic impact of all reform variants allowing for behavioral
changes induced by the reform.
Table 7 shows the percentage increase of labor supply as well as the cor-
responding bootstrapped confidence intervals10 for the final stages of the re-
form proposals.Labor supply increases some two percent.There is evidence
that the labor supply incentives are somewhat stronger for the CDU/CSU
opposition party proposal.The 95% confidence intervals reveal that the dif-
ferences are not significant.4.4. Cash Gains
Now I look at the distribution of cash gains.The cash gain for financial year t
is defined as the difference between the net disposable income in year t and
in the year 2000,allowing for adjustments in labor supply11.
Figure 2 shows estimated density functions of the monthly cash gains for
three tax reform proposals, allowing for labor supply adjustments.They are
based on Epanechnikov kernels, other kernel types do not change the esti-
mated density significantly.
Table 8 shows location parameters of the monthly cash gain distributions
according to alternative reform proposals.The government’s original propo-
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Table 7
Percentage Increase of Labor Supply 
Proposal Financial Increase 95% Confidence
Year (in %) Interval 
Government 2005 2.05 1.52 2.56 
Opposition 2003 2.21 1.67 2.73 
Compromise 2005 1.89 1.36 2.41
Source:Own calculations.Bias-corrected 95% bootstrap-confidence intervals based on 1,000
replications.
11 This reflects only the consumption dimension of the allocation problem faced by the house-
hold. The calculation of equivalent or compensating variations would be more satisfac-
tory. However, because of the enormous complexity of the German tax-benefit system
and the necessity to compute expected values across the total range of the error distribu-
tion, this is still a prohibitively time consuming process (see Preston and Walker, 1999).
Table 8
Cash Gains: Means and Medians in DM per Month
Proposal Financial Cash Gain Cash Gain 
Year (Mean) (Median) 
Government 2001 90 90 
2003 150 150 
2005 200 200 
Opposition 2003 260 200 
Compromise 2005 260 200
Source:Own calculations rounded to full 10 DM.328 Gerhard Wagenhals
sal implies that median and arithmetic mean of the gains are roughly equal,
the opposition’s proposal and the compromise imply that the arithmetic
means of the distributions are some 60 DM above their median. This indi-
cates a somewhat higher inequality of cash gains for the opposition and com-
promise proposals,which can be traced back to lower marginal tax rates for
higher taxable incomes.
4.5. Income Distribution
To assess changes in the distribution of net disposable income due to the 
reform I estimated various inequality measures. I calculated the indices 
proposed by Piesch, Gini and Theil. The Piesch index is most sensitive to
changes in high incomes, the Gini index to changes in middle incomes, and
the Theil index to changes in low incomes12.
Table 9 shows that all measures indicate increasing inequality compared
to the pre-reform status quo 2000.The percentage increase attains its maxi-
Figure 2
Distribution of Monthly Cash Gains, 2005. 
Approximation by Kernel Density Estimator
Source:Own calculations based on Epanechnikov kernels.
12 See e.g. Piesch (1975) for formal definitions of these inequality measures.mum when the bottom-sensitive Theil index is used. However, the absolute
increases are small when compared to their bootstrapped standard errors.
After the reform, the inequality of the distribution of the net disposable in-
come remains still considerably smaller than the inequality of the distribu-
tion of gross income (“Gesamtbetrag der Einkünfte”).
4.6. Who Profits?
Most households profit from the tax reform:in 2005,the real net disposable
income of some 97 percent of all households will be higher than in 2000.
Only some three percent of all households do not profit from the tax reform
because their taxable income is smaller than their basic personal allowance
before and after the reform.
Figure 3 shows the absolute relief of the households, measured as annual
cash gains,depending on annual gross income,for the initial government pro-
posal,the proposal of the CDU/CSU opposition,and the Bundesrat compro-
mise.I use the nonparametric robust local regression estimator proposed by
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Table 9
Impact on Distribution: Inequality of Net Disposable Income and of Gross
Income. Piesch, Gini, and Theil Indices (Bootstrapped Standard Errors 
in Italics)
Proposal Piesch Gini Theil 
Status Quo 2000 0.1367 0.1670 0.0545 
0.0018 0.0018 0.0020
Government 2001 0.1381 0.1689 0.0556 
0.0019 0.0019 0.0022
2003 0.1375 0.1683 0.0554 
0.0019 0.0019 0.0021
2005 0.1385 0.1696 0.0563 
0.0020 0.0020 0.0023
Opposition 2003 0.1458 0.1774 0.0631 
0.0021 0.0022 0.0028
Compromise 2005 0.1403 0.1716 0.0581 
0.0020 0.0019 0.0225
Gross income 2000 0.1865 0.2307 0.0989 
0.0024 0.0024 0.0036
Source:Own calculations.Bootstrapped standard errors based on 1,000 replications.Bias is of
no concern because it is always less than 5% of the standard error (see Efron,1982,p.8).330 Gerhard Wagenhals
Figure 3
Annual Cash Gains Depending on Annual Gross Income
Source:Own calculations.Nonparametric local regression using a lowess running-line smoother
(Cleveland,1979).Bandwidth:0.1.
Figure 4
Annual Cash Gains as Percentage of Annual Gross Income Depending 
on Annual Gross Income
Source:Own calculations.Nonparametric local regression using a lowess running-line smoother
(Cleveland,1979).Bandwidth:0.1.Cleveland (1979). Not surprisingly, for all reform proposals, gains increase
with gross income.
Figure 4 shows the relative relief of the households, measured by the an-
nual cash gains as percentage of the annual gross income,depending on an-
nual gross income for the same three reform proposals.The relative relief for
households with very small incomes amounts to some two percent.With in-
creasing gross income, relative relief first decreases somewhat, to increase
again to a level of some three percent of the gross income.The CDU/CSU
opposition’s proposal implies a somewhat higher relative relief for higher in-
come brackets.
5. Conclusions
This paper uses reforms of the German tax,social security and transfer system
to identify labor supply responses of married females.It closely follows a very
flexible microeconometric model proposed by Blundell, Duncan and Meghir
(1998) and adapts it to German conditions. I combine this microeconometric
model with my microsimulation model GMOD to analyze the most important
aspects of the tax reform 2000 for persons in dependent employment. How-
ever, I cannot model and analyze the reform of corporate taxation because a
suitable representative data set does not exist. Particularly, I cannot account
for the replacement of the system of full imputation of corporation tax by a so
called half-income system, which might be disadvantageous to some of the
small shareholders in the sample.Although I do have some information on the
level of income from capital investment, I do not know the structure of the
households’ portfolios.If I assume that households with higher gross incomes
tend to have higher dividend incomes,then the increase in relief of households
with higher gross income may be somewhat smaller than indicated above.
Summing up, the tax reform 2000 is a first important step to reduce the
disincentive effects of labor taxation.Although the tax reform alone will not
lead to a dramatic decline in unemployment, significant positive incentives
on labor supply cannot be ignored. If the impacts of tax reforms have to be
judged,behavioral changes must not be neglected.
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